Abortion: Strong's counterexamples fail

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Abortion: Strong's counterexamples fail. / Di Nucci, Ezio.

In: Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 35, No. 5, 05.2009, p. 304-5.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Di Nucci, E 2009, 'Abortion: Strong's counterexamples fail', Journal of Medical Ethics, vol. 35, no. 5, pp. 304-5. https://doi.org/10.1136/jme.2008.028233

APA

Di Nucci, E. (2009). Abortion: Strong's counterexamples fail. Journal of Medical Ethics, 35(5), 304-5. https://doi.org/10.1136/jme.2008.028233

Vancouver

Di Nucci E. Abortion: Strong's counterexamples fail. Journal of Medical Ethics. 2009 May;35(5):304-5. https://doi.org/10.1136/jme.2008.028233

Author

Di Nucci, Ezio. / Abortion: Strong's counterexamples fail. In: Journal of Medical Ethics. 2009 ; Vol. 35, No. 5. pp. 304-5.

Bibtex

@article{e66684516f0941279e933bda88a2da24,
title = "Abortion: Strong's counterexamples fail",
abstract = "This paper shows that the counterexamples proposed by Strong in 2008 in the Journal of Medical Ethics to Marquis's argument against abortion fail. Strong's basic idea is that there are cases--for example, terminally ill patients--where killing an adult human being is prima facie seriously morally wrong even though that human being is not being deprived of a {"}valuable future{"}. So Marquis would be wrong in thinking that what is essential about the wrongness of killing an adult human being is that they are being deprived of a valuable future. This paper shows that whichever way the concept of {"}valuable future{"} is interpreted, the proposed counterexamples fail: if it is interpreted as {"}future like ours{"}, the proposed counterexamples have no bearing on Marquis's argument. If the concept is interpreted as referring to the patient's preferences, it must be either conceded that the patients in Strong's scenarios have some valuable future or admitted that killing them is not seriously morally wrong. Finally, if {"}valuable future{"} is interpreted as referring to objective standards, one ends up with implausible and unpalatable moral claims.",
keywords = "Abortion, Induced, Beginning of Human Life, Female, Homicide, Human Rights, Humans, Male, Pregnancy, Terminally Ill, Value of Life",
author = "{Di Nucci}, Ezio",
year = "2009",
month = may,
doi = "10.1136/jme.2008.028233",
language = "English",
volume = "35",
pages = "304--5",
journal = "Journal of Medical Ethics",
issn = "0306-6800",
publisher = "BMJ Publishing Group",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Abortion: Strong's counterexamples fail

AU - Di Nucci, Ezio

PY - 2009/5

Y1 - 2009/5

N2 - This paper shows that the counterexamples proposed by Strong in 2008 in the Journal of Medical Ethics to Marquis's argument against abortion fail. Strong's basic idea is that there are cases--for example, terminally ill patients--where killing an adult human being is prima facie seriously morally wrong even though that human being is not being deprived of a "valuable future". So Marquis would be wrong in thinking that what is essential about the wrongness of killing an adult human being is that they are being deprived of a valuable future. This paper shows that whichever way the concept of "valuable future" is interpreted, the proposed counterexamples fail: if it is interpreted as "future like ours", the proposed counterexamples have no bearing on Marquis's argument. If the concept is interpreted as referring to the patient's preferences, it must be either conceded that the patients in Strong's scenarios have some valuable future or admitted that killing them is not seriously morally wrong. Finally, if "valuable future" is interpreted as referring to objective standards, one ends up with implausible and unpalatable moral claims.

AB - This paper shows that the counterexamples proposed by Strong in 2008 in the Journal of Medical Ethics to Marquis's argument against abortion fail. Strong's basic idea is that there are cases--for example, terminally ill patients--where killing an adult human being is prima facie seriously morally wrong even though that human being is not being deprived of a "valuable future". So Marquis would be wrong in thinking that what is essential about the wrongness of killing an adult human being is that they are being deprived of a valuable future. This paper shows that whichever way the concept of "valuable future" is interpreted, the proposed counterexamples fail: if it is interpreted as "future like ours", the proposed counterexamples have no bearing on Marquis's argument. If the concept is interpreted as referring to the patient's preferences, it must be either conceded that the patients in Strong's scenarios have some valuable future or admitted that killing them is not seriously morally wrong. Finally, if "valuable future" is interpreted as referring to objective standards, one ends up with implausible and unpalatable moral claims.

KW - Abortion, Induced

KW - Beginning of Human Life

KW - Female

KW - Homicide

KW - Human Rights

KW - Humans

KW - Male

KW - Pregnancy

KW - Terminally Ill

KW - Value of Life

U2 - 10.1136/jme.2008.028233

DO - 10.1136/jme.2008.028233

M3 - Journal article

C2 - 19407035

VL - 35

SP - 304

EP - 305

JO - Journal of Medical Ethics

JF - Journal of Medical Ethics

SN - 0306-6800

IS - 5

ER -

ID: 136849226