Eight Arguments against Double Effect

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › Research › peer-review

Standard

Eight Arguments against Double Effect. / Di Nucci, Ezio.

2014. Paper presented at Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Münster, Germany.

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Di Nucci, E 2014, 'Eight Arguments against Double Effect', Paper presented at Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Münster, Germany, 28/09/2014 - 02/10/2014. <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2475141>

APA

Di Nucci, E. (2014). Eight Arguments against Double Effect. Paper presented at Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Münster, Germany. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2475141

Vancouver

Di Nucci E. Eight Arguments against Double Effect. 2014. Paper presented at Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Münster, Germany.

Author

Di Nucci, Ezio. / Eight Arguments against Double Effect. Paper presented at Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Münster, Germany.15 p.

Bibtex

@conference{964573735df14171b187aba3cdb2ce57,
title = "Eight Arguments against Double Effect",
abstract = "I offer eight arguments against the Doctrine of Double Effect, a normative principle according to which in pursuing the good it is sometimes morally permissible to bring about some evil as a side-effect or merely foreseen consequence: the same evil would not be morally justified as an intended means or end.",
author = "{Di Nucci}, Ezio",
year = "2014",
language = "English",
note = "null ; Conference date: 28-09-2014 Through 02-10-2014",

}

RIS

TY - CONF

T1 - Eight Arguments against Double Effect

AU - Di Nucci, Ezio

N1 - Conference code: XXIII.

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - I offer eight arguments against the Doctrine of Double Effect, a normative principle according to which in pursuing the good it is sometimes morally permissible to bring about some evil as a side-effect or merely foreseen consequence: the same evil would not be morally justified as an intended means or end.

AB - I offer eight arguments against the Doctrine of Double Effect, a normative principle according to which in pursuing the good it is sometimes morally permissible to bring about some evil as a side-effect or merely foreseen consequence: the same evil would not be morally justified as an intended means or end.

M3 - Paper

Y2 - 28 September 2014 through 2 October 2014

ER -

ID: 138971638