TY - CONF

T1 - Nonjudicial Powers of Constitutional Court Presidents (presented at the EUI in June 2019)

AU - Drugda, Simon

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - This paper examines powers of constitutional court presidents (CCP) in world constitutions, building on an original dataset of their entrenched powers in all jurisdictions that establish a specialised constitutional judiciary. Repertoires of power of CCPs remain understudied in comparative perspective because of two related tendencies, the focus on courts over their component parts and standard over auxiliary functions. The standard set of powers of court presidents, such as the power of the casting vote or powers related to the financial independence of the court, reflect their dual judicial and administrative character. However, the data reveals that constitutions seldom entrench these powers. More increasingly, CCPs find use in auxiliary functions outside of the courtroom: in constitutional advisory roles, as substitute officeholders, in assistance with the resignation of the head of state, in ceremonial roles, and constitution-making. Higher distribution of auxiliary functions of CCPs in new constitutions in the Global South further suggests that this is a recent development. The entrenchment of auxiliary powers of CCPs became prevalent in constitutional design with the wave of post-colonial constitution-making.

AB - This paper examines powers of constitutional court presidents (CCP) in world constitutions, building on an original dataset of their entrenched powers in all jurisdictions that establish a specialised constitutional judiciary. Repertoires of power of CCPs remain understudied in comparative perspective because of two related tendencies, the focus on courts over their component parts and standard over auxiliary functions. The standard set of powers of court presidents, such as the power of the casting vote or powers related to the financial independence of the court, reflect their dual judicial and administrative character. However, the data reveals that constitutions seldom entrench these powers. More increasingly, CCPs find use in auxiliary functions outside of the courtroom: in constitutional advisory roles, as substitute officeholders, in assistance with the resignation of the head of state, in ceremonial roles, and constitution-making. Higher distribution of auxiliary functions of CCPs in new constitutions in the Global South further suggests that this is a recent development. The entrenchment of auxiliary powers of CCPs became prevalent in constitutional design with the wave of post-colonial constitution-making.

KW - Faculty of Law

KW - Constitutional courts

M3 - Paper

ER -