Sex: we can’t have it both ways

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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Sex: we can’t have it both ways. / Di Nucci, Ezio.

In: Monash Bioethics Review, Vol. 37, No. 1-2, 2019, p. 38-45.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Di Nucci, E 2019, 'Sex: we can’t have it both ways', Monash Bioethics Review, vol. 37, no. 1-2, pp. 38-45. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-019-00095-9

APA

Di Nucci, E. (2019). Sex: we can’t have it both ways. Monash Bioethics Review, 37(1-2), 38-45. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-019-00095-9

Vancouver

Di Nucci E. Sex: we can’t have it both ways. Monash Bioethics Review. 2019;37(1-2):38-45. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-019-00095-9

Author

Di Nucci, Ezio. / Sex: we can’t have it both ways. In: Monash Bioethics Review. 2019 ; Vol. 37, No. 1-2. pp. 38-45.

Bibtex

@article{9f90d53580754915ab9a0f8a3d63129e,
title = "Sex: we can’t have it both ways",
abstract = "I analyse the tension between a plausible liberal view of sex work and the similarly plausible idea that rape and other forms of sexual violence are made morally worse by their sexual nature. I find no conclusive reason to drop the liberal view of sex work, at least as long as the concept of voluntary and informed consent at the core of it is robust enough to account for the realities of prostitution around the world; nor should we abandon the idea that rape is no ordinary immoral act: reducing sexual violence to non-sexual violence would misrepresent the relevant phenomena and perpetuate injustice.",
author = "{Di Nucci}, Ezio",
year = "2019",
doi = "10.1007/s40592-019-00095-9",
language = "English",
volume = "37",
pages = "38--45",
journal = "Monash Bioethics Review",
issn = "1321-2753",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "1-2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Sex: we can’t have it both ways

AU - Di Nucci, Ezio

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - I analyse the tension between a plausible liberal view of sex work and the similarly plausible idea that rape and other forms of sexual violence are made morally worse by their sexual nature. I find no conclusive reason to drop the liberal view of sex work, at least as long as the concept of voluntary and informed consent at the core of it is robust enough to account for the realities of prostitution around the world; nor should we abandon the idea that rape is no ordinary immoral act: reducing sexual violence to non-sexual violence would misrepresent the relevant phenomena and perpetuate injustice.

AB - I analyse the tension between a plausible liberal view of sex work and the similarly plausible idea that rape and other forms of sexual violence are made morally worse by their sexual nature. I find no conclusive reason to drop the liberal view of sex work, at least as long as the concept of voluntary and informed consent at the core of it is robust enough to account for the realities of prostitution around the world; nor should we abandon the idea that rape is no ordinary immoral act: reducing sexual violence to non-sexual violence would misrepresent the relevant phenomena and perpetuate injustice.

U2 - 10.1007/s40592-019-00095-9

DO - 10.1007/s40592-019-00095-9

M3 - Journal article

C2 - 31376025

VL - 37

SP - 38

EP - 45

JO - Monash Bioethics Review

JF - Monash Bioethics Review

SN - 1321-2753

IS - 1-2

ER -

ID: 225662107