Trolleys and Double Effect in Experimental Ethics

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingBook chapterResearchpeer-review

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Trolleys and Double Effect in Experimental Ethics. / Di Nucci, Ezio.

Experimental Ethics: Toward an Empirical Moral Philosophy. ed. / Christoph Lütge; Hannes Rusch; Matthias Uhl. London : Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. p. 80-93.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingBook chapterResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Di Nucci, E 2014, Trolleys and Double Effect in Experimental Ethics. in C Lütge, H Rusch & M Uhl (eds), Experimental Ethics: Toward an Empirical Moral Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp. 80-93.

APA

Di Nucci, E. (2014). Trolleys and Double Effect in Experimental Ethics. In C. Lütge, H. Rusch, & M. Uhl (Eds.), Experimental Ethics: Toward an Empirical Moral Philosophy (pp. 80-93). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Vancouver

Di Nucci E. Trolleys and Double Effect in Experimental Ethics. In Lütge C, Rusch H, Uhl M, editors, Experimental Ethics: Toward an Empirical Moral Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 2014. p. 80-93

Author

Di Nucci, Ezio. / Trolleys and Double Effect in Experimental Ethics. Experimental Ethics: Toward an Empirical Moral Philosophy. editor / Christoph Lütge ; Hannes Rusch ; Matthias Uhl. London : Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. pp. 80-93

Bibtex

@inbook{8109602f1e864108a0c383407e224f96,
title = "Trolleys and Double Effect in Experimental Ethics",
abstract = "I analyse the relationship between the Doctrine of Double Effect and the Trolley Problem: the former offers a solution for the latter only on the premise that killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is permissible. Here I offer both empirical and theoretical arguments against the permissibility of killing the one: firstly, I present data from my own empirical studies according to which the intuition that killing the one is permissible is neither widespread nor stable; secondly, I defend a normative principle according to which killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is not permissible. In conclusion, there just is no trolley problem.",
author = "{Di Nucci}, Ezio",
year = "2014",
month = "10",
language = "English",
isbn = "9781137409799",
pages = "80--93",
editor = "Christoph L{\"u}tge and Hannes Rusch and Matthias Uhl",
booktitle = "Experimental Ethics",
publisher = "Palgrave Macmillan",
address = "United Kingdom",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Trolleys and Double Effect in Experimental Ethics

AU - Di Nucci, Ezio

PY - 2014/10

Y1 - 2014/10

N2 - I analyse the relationship between the Doctrine of Double Effect and the Trolley Problem: the former offers a solution for the latter only on the premise that killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is permissible. Here I offer both empirical and theoretical arguments against the permissibility of killing the one: firstly, I present data from my own empirical studies according to which the intuition that killing the one is permissible is neither widespread nor stable; secondly, I defend a normative principle according to which killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is not permissible. In conclusion, there just is no trolley problem.

AB - I analyse the relationship between the Doctrine of Double Effect and the Trolley Problem: the former offers a solution for the latter only on the premise that killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is permissible. Here I offer both empirical and theoretical arguments against the permissibility of killing the one: firstly, I present data from my own empirical studies according to which the intuition that killing the one is permissible is neither widespread nor stable; secondly, I defend a normative principle according to which killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is not permissible. In conclusion, there just is no trolley problem.

M3 - Book chapter

SN - 9781137409799

SP - 80

EP - 93

BT - Experimental Ethics

A2 - Lütge, Christoph

A2 - Rusch, Hannes

A2 - Uhl, Matthias

PB - Palgrave Macmillan

CY - London

ER -

ID: 136813967