Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider
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Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider. / Jensen, Rasmus Thybo.
In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 8, No. 3, 09.2009, p. 371-388.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider
AU - Jensen, Rasmus Thybo
PY - 2009/9
Y1 - 2009/9
N2 - I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with Merleau-Ponty’s general methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein.
AB - I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with Merleau-Ponty’s general methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein.
U2 - 10.1007/s11097-009-9122-x
DO - 10.1007/s11097-009-9122-x
M3 - Journal article
VL - 8
SP - 371
EP - 388
JO - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
JF - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
SN - 1568-7759
IS - 3
ER -
ID: 32647394