TY - GEN

T1 - Preferences and beliefs in intergroup conflict

AU - Columbus, Simon

AU - Thielmann, Isabel

AU - Zettler, Ingo

AU - Böhm, Robert

PY - 2021/8/18

Y1 - 2021/8/18

N2 - To solve the puzzle of individual participation in intergroup conflict, theoreticalaccounts rooted in various disciplines suggest that individuals’ interconnected social preferences for the welfare of in-group and out-group members predict their conflict engagement. Yet, research also suggests that individuals may reciprocate anticipated and actual harmful behaviour from out-group members or beneficial behaviour from in-group members. We combined these different approaches and tested the relative importance of preferences and beliefs in predicting conflict participation. To this end, we elicited both preferences towards in-group and out-group members and beliefs aboutin-group and out-group members’ behaviours prior to playing an incentivised intergroup conflict game with natural groups (N = 973). In this game, individuals could engage in costly behaviour to either benefit their in-group (without consequences to the out-group) or to both benefit their in-group and harm the out-group. Both preferences and beliefs contributed to explaining in-group beneficial and out-group harming behaviour. Importantly, however, beliefs were more strongly associated with behaviour than group-based preferences. Moreover, we found that negative reciprocity towardsout-group members was stronger when the out-group was expected to actually harm the in-group rather than to merely harbour ill intentions. Taken together, the findings suggest that participation in intergroup conflict is better explained by positive and negative reciprocity than purely by group-based preferences.

AB - To solve the puzzle of individual participation in intergroup conflict, theoreticalaccounts rooted in various disciplines suggest that individuals’ interconnected social preferences for the welfare of in-group and out-group members predict their conflict engagement. Yet, research also suggests that individuals may reciprocate anticipated and actual harmful behaviour from out-group members or beneficial behaviour from in-group members. We combined these different approaches and tested the relative importance of preferences and beliefs in predicting conflict participation. To this end, we elicited both preferences towards in-group and out-group members and beliefs aboutin-group and out-group members’ behaviours prior to playing an incentivised intergroup conflict game with natural groups (N = 973). In this game, individuals could engage in costly behaviour to either benefit their in-group (without consequences to the out-group) or to both benefit their in-group and harm the out-group. Both preferences and beliefs contributed to explaining in-group beneficial and out-group harming behaviour. Importantly, however, beliefs were more strongly associated with behaviour than group-based preferences. Moreover, we found that negative reciprocity towardsout-group members was stronger when the out-group was expected to actually harm the in-group rather than to merely harbour ill intentions. Taken together, the findings suggest that participation in intergroup conflict is better explained by positive and negative reciprocity than purely by group-based preferences.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Intergroup conflict

KW - IPD-MD

KW - Parochial altruism

KW - Reciprocity

KW - Social preferences

U2 - 10.31234/osf.io/ghvty

DO - 10.31234/osf.io/ghvty

M3 - Other contribution

ER -