Similarity Arguments in the Genetic Modification Debate

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Similarity Arguments in the Genetic Modification Debate. / Christiansen, Andreas.

In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2017, p. 239-255.

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Harvard

Christiansen, A 2017, 'Similarity Arguments in the Genetic Modification Debate', Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 239-255. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9757-y

APA

Christiansen, A. (2017). Similarity Arguments in the Genetic Modification Debate. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 20(2), 239-255. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9757-y

Vancouver

Christiansen A. Similarity Arguments in the Genetic Modification Debate. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 2017;20(2):239-255. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9757-y

Author

Christiansen, Andreas. / Similarity Arguments in the Genetic Modification Debate. In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 2017 ; Vol. 20, No. 2. pp. 239-255.

Bibtex

@article{034e228fa0ec414d935594c608dc1841,
title = "Similarity Arguments in the Genetic Modification Debate",
abstract = "In the ethical debate on genetic modification (GM), it is common to encounter the claim that some anti-GM argument would also apply an established, ethically accepted technology, and that the anti-GM argument is therefore unsuccessful. The paper discusses whether this argumentative strategy, the Similarity Argument, is sound. It presents a logically valid, generic form of the Similarity Argument and then shows that it is subject to three types of objection: (i) It does not respect the difference between pro tanto reasons and all-things-considered judgments; (ii) it relies on the unproblematic transferability of reasons from one case to another; and (iii) it runs the risk of equivocations, especially in cases where the anti-genetic-modification argument relies on gradable features. The paper then shows how these issues play out in three specific Similarity Arguments that can be found in the literature. Finally, the paper discusses what conclusions we can draw from the fact that genetic modification and established technologies are similar for the ethical status of genetic modification.",
keywords = "Faculty of Humanities, Genetic engineering, Ethics, Particularism, Analogy, Bioethics, Environmental ethics",
author = "Andreas Christiansen",
year = "2017",
doi = "10.1007/s10677-016-9757-y",
language = "English",
volume = "20",
pages = "239--255",
journal = "Ethical Theory and Moral Practice",
issn = "1386-2820",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Similarity Arguments in the Genetic Modification Debate

AU - Christiansen, Andreas

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - In the ethical debate on genetic modification (GM), it is common to encounter the claim that some anti-GM argument would also apply an established, ethically accepted technology, and that the anti-GM argument is therefore unsuccessful. The paper discusses whether this argumentative strategy, the Similarity Argument, is sound. It presents a logically valid, generic form of the Similarity Argument and then shows that it is subject to three types of objection: (i) It does not respect the difference between pro tanto reasons and all-things-considered judgments; (ii) it relies on the unproblematic transferability of reasons from one case to another; and (iii) it runs the risk of equivocations, especially in cases where the anti-genetic-modification argument relies on gradable features. The paper then shows how these issues play out in three specific Similarity Arguments that can be found in the literature. Finally, the paper discusses what conclusions we can draw from the fact that genetic modification and established technologies are similar for the ethical status of genetic modification.

AB - In the ethical debate on genetic modification (GM), it is common to encounter the claim that some anti-GM argument would also apply an established, ethically accepted technology, and that the anti-GM argument is therefore unsuccessful. The paper discusses whether this argumentative strategy, the Similarity Argument, is sound. It presents a logically valid, generic form of the Similarity Argument and then shows that it is subject to three types of objection: (i) It does not respect the difference between pro tanto reasons and all-things-considered judgments; (ii) it relies on the unproblematic transferability of reasons from one case to another; and (iii) it runs the risk of equivocations, especially in cases where the anti-genetic-modification argument relies on gradable features. The paper then shows how these issues play out in three specific Similarity Arguments that can be found in the literature. Finally, the paper discusses what conclusions we can draw from the fact that genetic modification and established technologies are similar for the ethical status of genetic modification.

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - Genetic engineering

KW - Ethics

KW - Particularism

KW - Analogy

KW - Bioethics

KW - Environmental ethics

U2 - 10.1007/s10677-016-9757-y

DO - 10.1007/s10677-016-9757-y

M3 - Journal article

VL - 20

SP - 239

EP - 255

JO - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

JF - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

SN - 1386-2820

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 170763047