The Limits of Control: Competition Law Versus Sector Regulation in the Wake of the European Commission Excessive Pricing Decision in Aspen

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

The Limits of Control: Competition Law Versus Sector Regulation in the Wake of the European Commission Excessive Pricing Decision in Aspen. / Kianzad, Behrang.

In: European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2022, p. 207 - 221.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Kianzad, B 2022, 'The Limits of Control: Competition Law Versus Sector Regulation in the Wake of the European Commission Excessive Pricing Decision in Aspen', European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 207 - 221. https://doi.org/10.21552/core/2022/3/5

APA

Kianzad, B. (2022). The Limits of Control: Competition Law Versus Sector Regulation in the Wake of the European Commission Excessive Pricing Decision in Aspen. European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, 6(3), 207 - 221. https://doi.org/10.21552/core/2022/3/5

Vancouver

Kianzad B. The Limits of Control: Competition Law Versus Sector Regulation in the Wake of the European Commission Excessive Pricing Decision in Aspen. European Competition and Regulatory Law Review. 2022;6(3): 207 - 221. https://doi.org/10.21552/core/2022/3/5

Author

Kianzad, Behrang. / The Limits of Control: Competition Law Versus Sector Regulation in the Wake of the European Commission Excessive Pricing Decision in Aspen. In: European Competition and Regulatory Law Review. 2022 ; Vol. 6, No. 3. pp. 207 - 221.

Bibtex

@article{fda189c7ef1b4500ac7072bb2af6c387,
title = "The Limits of Control: Competition Law Versus Sector Regulation in the Wake of the European Commission Excessive Pricing Decision in Aspen",
abstract = "Despite being heavily regulated, the pharmaceutical sector in Europe has in recent years noted many enforcement decisions against excessive pharmaceutical pricing as an anti-competitive practice under Article 102(a) TFEU. Although described as a {\textquoteleft}rarity{\textquoteright} in competition law in most parts of the doctrine, numerous excessive pricing cases have emerged in Italy, UK, Denmark, and the Netherlands in recent years, but also on the European Commission level. The European competition authority adopted its first excessive pricing commitment decision against a pharmaceutical undertaking (Aspen) in April 2021. Take into account the manifold points of contention in the literature on excessive pricing, concerning the normative issue of preventing supra-competitive pricing on part of dominant undertakings. Add the tension between competition law and sector regulation;, as well as the practical issue of calculating cost, prices and profits for the purpose of finding out the {\textquoteleft}excess{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteleft}unfairness{\textquoteright}, and one can see the Aspen case is of particular importance for future cases.",
keywords = "Faculty of Law, excessive pricing, competition law, sector regulation, European Commission",
author = "Behrang Kianzad",
year = "2022",
doi = "10.21552/core/2022/3/5",
language = "English",
volume = "6",
pages = " 207 -- 221",
journal = "European Competition and Regulatory Law Review",
publisher = "Lexxion",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Limits of Control: Competition Law Versus Sector Regulation in the Wake of the European Commission Excessive Pricing Decision in Aspen

AU - Kianzad, Behrang

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - Despite being heavily regulated, the pharmaceutical sector in Europe has in recent years noted many enforcement decisions against excessive pharmaceutical pricing as an anti-competitive practice under Article 102(a) TFEU. Although described as a ‘rarity’ in competition law in most parts of the doctrine, numerous excessive pricing cases have emerged in Italy, UK, Denmark, and the Netherlands in recent years, but also on the European Commission level. The European competition authority adopted its first excessive pricing commitment decision against a pharmaceutical undertaking (Aspen) in April 2021. Take into account the manifold points of contention in the literature on excessive pricing, concerning the normative issue of preventing supra-competitive pricing on part of dominant undertakings. Add the tension between competition law and sector regulation;, as well as the practical issue of calculating cost, prices and profits for the purpose of finding out the ‘excess’ and ‘unfairness’, and one can see the Aspen case is of particular importance for future cases.

AB - Despite being heavily regulated, the pharmaceutical sector in Europe has in recent years noted many enforcement decisions against excessive pharmaceutical pricing as an anti-competitive practice under Article 102(a) TFEU. Although described as a ‘rarity’ in competition law in most parts of the doctrine, numerous excessive pricing cases have emerged in Italy, UK, Denmark, and the Netherlands in recent years, but also on the European Commission level. The European competition authority adopted its first excessive pricing commitment decision against a pharmaceutical undertaking (Aspen) in April 2021. Take into account the manifold points of contention in the literature on excessive pricing, concerning the normative issue of preventing supra-competitive pricing on part of dominant undertakings. Add the tension between competition law and sector regulation;, as well as the practical issue of calculating cost, prices and profits for the purpose of finding out the ‘excess’ and ‘unfairness’, and one can see the Aspen case is of particular importance for future cases.

KW - Faculty of Law

KW - excessive pricing

KW - competition law

KW - sector regulation

KW - European Commission

UR - https://core.lexxion.eu/article/CORE/2022/3/5

U2 - 10.21552/core/2022/3/5

DO - 10.21552/core/2022/3/5

M3 - Journal article

VL - 6

SP - 207

EP - 221

JO - European Competition and Regulatory Law Review

JF - European Competition and Regulatory Law Review

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 327938883