Trolleys and Double Effect in Experimental Ethics
Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Book chapter › Research › peer-review
I analyse the relationship between the Doctrine of Double Effect and the Trolley Problem: the former offers a solution for the latter only on the premise that killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is permissible. Here I offer both empirical and theoretical arguments against the permissibility of killing the one: firstly, I present data from my own empirical studies according to which the intuition that killing the one is permissible is neither widespread nor stable; secondly, I defend a normative principle according to which killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is not permissible. In conclusion, there just is no trolley problem.
|Title of host publication||Experimental Ethics : Toward an Empirical Moral Philosophy|
|Editors||Christoph Lütge, Hannes Rusch, Matthias Uhl|
|Place of Publication||London|
|Publication date||Oct 2014|
|Publication status||Published - Oct 2014|