Trolleys and Double Effect in Experimental Ethics

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingBook chapterResearchpeer-review

I analyse the relationship between the Doctrine of Double Effect and the Trolley Problem: the former offers a solution for the latter only on the premise that killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is permissible. Here I offer both empirical and theoretical arguments against the permissibility of killing the one: firstly, I present data from my own empirical studies according to which the intuition that killing the one is permissible is neither widespread nor stable; secondly, I defend a normative principle according to which killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is not permissible. In conclusion, there just is no trolley problem.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationExperimental Ethics : Toward an Empirical Moral Philosophy
EditorsChristoph Lütge, Hannes Rusch, Matthias Uhl
Place of PublicationLondon
PublisherPalgrave Macmillan
Publication dateOct 2014
ISBN (Print)9781137409799
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2014
Externally publishedYes

ID: 136813967